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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)G) (2001). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The only issue properly before the district court was the only issue decided by 
Park Cityfs Board of Adjustment: whether plaintiffs and appellants Bret Fox and Tawnya 
Fox timely appealed Park City's decision to issue a building permit to appellee Legacy 
Development Group, LLC. The district court based its summary judgment ruling on its 
resolution of this issue alone. Consequently, the only issue before this Court is whether 
the Foxes' appeal of the permit issuance decision was timely. (R. 225.) 
The district court's decision was made in the context of cross motions for summary 
judgment. In determining whether the district court correctly granted Legacy 
Development's summary judgment motion, this Court reviews for correctness. Ault v. 
Holden, 2002 UT 33, f 15, 44 P.3d 781. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The following statutory provisions are determinative of the appeal. 
Utah Code Ann, § 10-9a-701 (2005): 
(1) Each municipality adopting a land use ordinance shall, by ordinance, 
establish one or more appeal authorities to hear and decide: 
(a) requests for variances from the terms of the land use ordinances; and 
(b) appeals from decisions applying the land use ordinances. 
(2) As a condition precedent to judicial review, each adversely affected 
person shall timely and specifically challenge a land use authority's 
decision, in accordance with local ordinance. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-704 (2006): 
(1) The municipality shall enact an ordinance establishing a reasonable time 
of not less than ten days to appeal to an appeal authority a written decision 
issued by a land use authority. 
(2) In the absence of an ordinance establishing a reasonable time to appeal, 
an adversely affected party shall have ten calendar days to appeal to an 
appeal authority a written decision issued by a land use authority. 
The ordinances determinative of the appeal are all found in Park City's Land 
Management Code ("LMC"). Each of the following sections is set forth in the 
Addendum to this brief: 
LMC § 15-1-8 
LMC §15-1-9 
LMC § 15-1-12 
LMC § 15-1-17 
LMC§ 15-1-18 
LMC § 15-10-9 
LMC§ 15-15-1.90 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND 
DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
The case concerns the timeliness of an administrative appeal. When Park City's 
Board of Adjustment rejected the Foxes' appeal of the decision to issue a building permit 
to Legacy Development, the Foxes petitioned the Third District Court, Summit County, 
2 
the Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck, for relief. (R. 1.) The named defendants are Park City, 
the Park City Board of Adjustment and Legacy Development. 
After some discovery, Park City filed a motion to dismiss that the district court 
treated as a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (R. 58.) Legacy Development and the 
Foxes then filed cross motions for summary judgment. (R. 66 and 130.) The district 
court heard oral argument on the motions on June 4, 2007 and two days later issued its 
"Ruling and Order" granting Legacy Development's and Park City's motions, and 
denying the Foxes1. (R. 208.) 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 14, 2005, the Park City Community Development Department (the 
"Department") issued a building permit to Legacy Development for its project at 1240 
Lowell Avenue in Park City (the "Project"). (R. 3.) Six months later, on January 19, 
2006, the Foxes first appealed the Department's decision to issue the building permit, 
claiming that the height of the Project exceeds the restrictions of Park City's Land 
Management Code. (R. 6.) 
On June 14, 2006, the Park City Planning Commission heard the Foxes' appeal 
and, by a 5 to 0 vote, found as follows: 
• "Land Management Code Section 15-1-18 requires appeal of staff decisions 
within 10 days of Final Action." 
• "Final Action regarding building height compliance is taken by issuance of a 
building permit." 
• "The appellant filed an incomplete appeal on January 19, 2006." 
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Based on these findings, the Planning Commission concluded it lacked "jurisdiction over 
the appeal for failure to timely file the appeal." (R. 110-111.) On appeal from the 
Planning Commission, the Board of Adjustment reached the same conclusion. (R. 80.) 
The Foxes lived at 1226 Lowell Avenue in Park City from 2002 through late 2006. 
Their home was one house away from the Project site. (R. 70.) The Foxes first noticed 
construction activity at the Project site in the fall of 2005. Id. Appellant Bret Fox is in 
the real estate development business. He and his partner design and construct buildings 
using architects, engineers and general contractors. Id. As a result of his real estate 
development work, Mr. Fox understood that an owner must apply for and be granted a 
building permit before starting a construction project. Id. Mr. Fox knew, in the fall of 
2005, that a building permit had been issued to Legacy Development for the construction 
activity he noticed at the Project site. Id. Nevertheless, the Foxes waited several more 
months before investigating the nature of the permitted construction and filing an 
administrative appeal challenging issuance of the permit. (R. 110-111.)1 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Foxes' challenge to the permit came six months too late. Under Park City's 
Land Management Code, the Foxes had ten days from the July 14, 2005 permit issuance 
to appeal. Even if the code is ignored and the ten-day appeal period started in the fall of 
2005 when the Foxes admit they knew the permit had been issued, they missed any 
1
 The Foxes' "Statement of Facts" contains a number of unsupported allegations 
pertaining to the substance of the Foxes' challenge to the building permit. Since the only 
issue before the Court is the timeliness of the Fox!s appeal, the substantive allegations are 
irrelevant. Because the Foxes include the substantive allegations in their opening brief, 
however, Legacy Development includes its rebuttal in the Addendum to this brief. 
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conceivable appeal window by waiting several months more to challenge the permit. 
Their failure to timely appeal prevented the district court from exercising subject matter 
jurisdiction over the dispute, requiring dismissal. 
Contrary to the Foxesf arguments, Park City's decision to issue the building permit 
was the kind of "Final Action" which triggered the ten day appeal period. Pursuant to 
applicable LMC provisions, Park City's planning, engineering and building departments 
approved Legacy Development's permit application and noted their approval by issuing 
the building permit. The permit was the "written decision" which, by definition, 
constituted Final Action on the permit application. LMC §15-15-1.90. 
Neither the LMC nor the state code tolls the appeal period pending discovery. 
Consequently, the Foxes' argument that they appealed when they discovered that the 
permit allowed what they characterize as a height violation is unavailing. For obvious 
reasons, at some point in time certainty is necessary regarding the finality of a 
municipality's decision to issue a building permit. The legislative decision to make that 
point in time ten days after permit issuance reflects a sensible policy decision. 
The Foxes5 argument that they had no obligation to investigate or challenge the 
building permit until the alleged height violation was finally apparent to them creates an 
unworkable, subjective discovery rule. Timeliness becomes a meaningless concept since 
it would vary with the diligence and observational powers of the party challenging the 
permit. Moreover, a developer's investment in its project is never secure under the Foxes' 
subjective rule. A developer like Legacy Development can spend many months and 
hundreds of thousands of dollars in reliance on an issued building permit only to face the 
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prospect of devastating economic loss when and if a neighbor happens to notice an 
alleged code violation. 
The "timely" administrative appeal of a land use decision is "a condition precedent 
to judicial review...." Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-701(2)(2005). Because the Foxes cannot 
now file a "timely" administrative appeal, they are not able to satisfy a condition 
precedent to judicial review. The district courfs decision was correct as a matter of law 
and of policy. This Court should affirm. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFFS' FAILURE TO TIMELY APPEAL PRECLUDES SUBJECT 
MATTER JURISDICTION 
The decision by Park Cityfs Planning Director to issue the building permit was the 
culmination of a process structured by the LMC. The first step in that process was 
Legacy Development's application for the permit. The Planning Department reviewed 
the application for compliance with the LMC and forwarded the application materials to 
the Engineering and Building departments for review and approval. According to LMC 
2 LMC§ 15-1-9 reads: 
(A) An Applicant must file a Complete Application, using the forms established 
by the Planning Department, and include payment of all fees. On any Application 
to construct a Building or other Improvement to Property which is defined by this 
Code as an Allowed Use in the zone in which the Building is proposed, the 
Planning Department must review the Application .... 
(B) If approved by the Planning Department Planning Staff, the plans must be 
forwarded to the Engineering Department and Building Department. The plans 
shall be reviewed for Building Code compliance and Permit issuance procedures. 
Approval of Allowed Uses must be noted by the issuance of a Building Permit in 
compliance with the provisions of the Uniform Building Code, as adopted by Park 
City. 
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§ 15-1-9(B), all three departments "noted" their approval of Legacy Development's 
application "by the issuance" of the building permit. 
The right to appeal the decision to issue the permit is provided by LMC 
§ 15-1-18(A): "[any] decision by the Planning Director regarding Application of this 
LMC to a Property may be appealed to the Planning Commission." The filing period for 
the appeal is set by LMC § 15-1-18 (E): "[all] Appeals must be made within ten (10) 
calendar days of the Final Action."3 LMC § 15-15-1.90 defines "Final Action" as the 
"later of the final vote or written decision on a matter." Here, the "matter" was Legacy 
Development's building permit application. The written decision on the matter was the 
written, signed building permit issued to Legacy Development on July 14, 2005. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-701(2)(2005) makes the "timely" administrative appeal 
of a land use decision "a condition precedent to judicial review...." In this case, a timely 
administrative appeal had to be filed within the ten calendar days allowed by LMC 
§ 15-1-18(E). The land use decision granting the building permit was made when the 
permit was issued on July 14, 2005, and the Foxes missed the statutory deadline when 
they failed to appeal by July 24, 2005. 
Because the Foxes missed the statutory deadline, they could not file a "timely" 
administrative appeal and were not able to satisfy a condition precedent to judicial 
review. Consequently, the district court was left with no option but to dismiss the Foxes' 
complaint with prejudice. See, e.g., Lund v. Cottonwood Meadows Company, 392 P.2d 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-704(2) provides the same "ten calendar days to appeal" in the 
absence of a municipal ordinance addressing the matter. 
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40 (Utah 1964) (affirming summary judgment for defendants where plaintiff failed to 
appeal to the proper administrative tribunal within the allotted time period). 
The Foxes argue that the district court misunderstood the meaning of "Final 
Action." Their argument is that Park City's decision to issue the building permit was not 
a "Final Action" which triggered the ten day appeal period and they had the right to 
challenge the building permit whenever they happened to notice what they interpreted to 
be a zoning violation. Pursuant to that right, the Foxes argue that their appeal more than 
six months after permit issuance was timely. 
The argument is based on four equally meritless positions: 
• That "a 'Final Action' requiring an appeal within ten days is a written decision 
issued by one of the City's Boards or Commissions ...." Foxes' Opening Brief 
at 12. 
• That only decisions that create "vested rights" are Final Action and "a building 
permit does not create vested rights." Id. at 15. 
• That "Final Actions are typically those that are rendered after notice and a 
hearing." Id. at 17. 
• That "due process requires notice prior to the elimination of [the rights of 
adjoining property owners, such as view corridors . . . .]" Id. at 20. 
The first three positions, based on the meaning of "Final Action," misconstrue the LMC. 
The fourth position is based on a misunderstanding of due process law. 
A. Issuance of a Building Permit Is "Final Action" on the Permit 
Application 
The Foxes' first position is based on the notion that the LMC requires a written 
decision on a permit application by "a deliberative body" before the decision can be 
8 
deemed Final Action. Foxes' Opening Brief %X 13. The Foxes assert that only a single 
"staff member" — not a "deliberative body" — acted on the permit application: 
[T]he building permit was issued in a day-to-day decision of a staff 
Department member. In issuing this permit, that staff member did not vote 
or issue a written decision.... In issuing the permit, the staff member did 
nothing which would fall within the definition of a Final Action under the 
LMC. 
Id. at 14. 
The first problem with the argument is its factual predicate. Nothing in the record 
suggests that the permit was issued based on "the single act of a staff member...." Id. On 
the contrary, and as already noted, LMC § 15-1-9 demonstrates that the decision is 
actually made based on input from three separate city departments. The planning, 
engineering and building departments approved Legacy Development's application and 
"noted" their approval "by the issuance" of the building permit. LMC § 15-1-9 (B). In 
other words, the building permit was the "written decision" on the application. 
The second problem with the Foxes' argument is it finds no support in the LMC. 
Nothing in the LMC ties Final Action on a permit application to a written decision by 
"one of the City's Boards or Commissions ...." Foxes' Opening Brief 'at 12. The 
definition of Final Action — "the final vote or written decision on a matter" — lends no 
support to the argument. LMC § 15-15-1.90. Moreover, the LMC expressly makes 
approval of the permit the final decision on the application. LMC § 15-1-8 ends with a 
chart which graphically summarizes the review process and makes clear that the city's 
Planning Department both reviews and makes the final decision on the allowed use 
Legacy Development applied to build: 
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The Foxes' mistake is in failing to distinguish between the roles mandated by the 
LMC for the Planning Department on the one hand, and the various "Boards or 
Commissions ..." on the other hand. Foxes' Opening Brief dX 12. As the district court 
noted in its Ruling and Order: 
[I]n the initial phases of land management decisions [final action] occurs 
when a deciding body does the latter of taking a final vote or writing a 
decision on a matter. LMC § 15-15-1.90.... During appeals to the Planning 
Commission and Board of Adjustment, finality occurs when the deciding 
body executes written findings of fact and conclusions of law on the appeal 
or reconsideration. LMC § 15-1-18 (N). 
(R. 216.) The district couifs point is that Final Action takes different forms depending 
on who or what is rendering the decision. The Planning Director's decision regarding 
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application of the "LMC to a Property" could take the form of a written building permit. 
LMC § 15-1-18 (A). The Planning Commission's decision on an appeal from the permit 
issuance takes the form of written findings of fact and conclusions of law. LMC 
§ 15-1-18 (H). 
The District Court concisely identified the shortcoming in the Foxes1 position: 
Plaintiffs1 argument ignores the LMC's... distinctions between finality 
requirements at different levels of decision-making. Written findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are only required if a final action is taken at the 
appellate or reconsideration level. In contrast, an initial staff decision (to 
issue or not issue a building permit) is final when the latter of a vote or 
written decision is issued on a matter. 
(R. 220.) The Foxes implicitly recognize the distinction when they note: "in the context 
of an appeal, LMC § 15-1-18(N) provides that a 'Final Action occurs when the deciding 
body has adopted and executed written findings of fact and conclusions of law.1" Foxes1 
Opening Brief dX 12 (emphasis added). What the Foxes fail to recognize is that the 
parties were not "in the context of an appeal" when the permit decision was made. 
Consequently, section 15-1-18(N) does not apply. Instead, the more general definition of 
"Final Action" applies: "the final vote or written decision on a matter." LMC 
§ 15-15-1.90. 
Written decisions constituting "Final Action" and requiring an appeal within ten 
days, if at all, include more than the decisions issued by "the City's Boards or 
Commissions ...." Foxes' Opening Brief at 12. They include the decisions expressly 
within the purview of the Planning Department. The issued building permit was "Final 
Action" on the permit application. 
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B. "Final Action" Is Not Limited to Decisions That Create Vested Rights 
The Foxes next argue that, unlike an "appellate decision made after a public 
hearing...," the decision to issue "a building permit does not create vested rights ...." 
Foxes' Opening Brief at 15. The point of the argument is that the decision to issue 
Legacy Development's permit should not be considered Final Action because only 
decisions that create vested rights should be considered final. 
The Foxes offer no supporting authority for the argument and its logical 
underpinnings are suspect. If Final Action on a building permit application requires 
administrative appellate review and no one appeals the decision to issue the permit, the 
recipient of the permit never has finality unless it somehow mounts its own challenge to 
the permit decision. But such a challenge is not possible since no administrative review 
process is available to an entity whose permit application is granted. The permit recipient 
has no means to establish finality if finality requires administrative appellate review. 
The Foxes argue that Legacy Development could have secured finality by ignoring 
the Planning Department's decision to issue the permit and applying to the Board of 
Adjustment for a variance. One obvious problem with the idea is that a variance was 
never available to Legacy Development. The applicable LMC section reads: 
Any Person or entity desiring a waiver or modification of the requirements 
of the Land Management Code as applied to a Parcel or Property that 
he/she owns... may apply to the Board of Adjustment for a variance from 
the terms of the Land Management Code. 
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LMC § 15-10-9(A). The concept of a variance - "a waiver or modification of the 
requirements of the [LMC]..." — only has meaning where the city applies its code 
in a way contrary to that sought through a particular application. 
Here, Park City applied the LMC to render a decision consistent with 
Legacy Development's application. No "waiver or modification of the 
requirements of the [LMC]..." was needed, or even available, because the city's 
planning, engineering and building department agreed that "the [LMC] as applied 
to..." Legacy Development's property allowed what it sought through its 
application. The only way Legacy Development could have applied for a variance 
is if the Planning Department had denied the application in whole or part. Since 
the application was approved, the concept of a variance never applied. 
Whether an issued building permit creates vested rights is open to debate.4 But the 
notion that Final Action only comes after a decision which creates vested rights is 
contrary to the plain language of the LMC and is, at best, impractical. 
4
 See LMC § 15-1 -7 7(A) (1) , titled "VESTING": 
An Applicant is entitled to approval of a land Use Application if the Application 
conforms to the requirements of an applicable land Use ordinance in effect when a 
complete Application is submitted and all fees have been paid, unless: 
(a) the land Use authority, on the record, finds that a compelling, countervailing 
public interest would be jeopardized by approving the Application, or 
(b) in the manner provided by local ordinance and before the Application is 
submitted, the municipality has formally initiated proceedings to amend its 
ordinances in a manner that would prohibit approval of the Application as 
submitted. 
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C. Notice and a Hearing Are Not Required for Final Action on a Permit 
Application 
The Foxes1 next point is that "Final Actions are typically those that are rendered 
after notice and a hearing." Foxes' Opening Brief at 17. From this conclusion, the Foxes 
argue that issuance of Legacy Developments building permit was not Final Action since 
the Planning Department gave no notice and held no hearing before issuing the permit. 
The Foxes made the same argument to the district court. They claimed that LMC 
§ 15-15-1.90 "defines a Final Action as an action memorialized by 'the final vote or 
written decision' after notice and a hearing." (R. 143.) The actual definition of Final 
Action says nothing about "notice and a hearing." As Park City's Planning Director put 
it, the "Final Action on this matter was issuance of the Building Permit No. B05-10308 
on July 14, 2005." (R. 133 at Exhibit G.) Simply put, nothing about the definition of 
Final Action supports the Foxes1 "notice and a hearing" argument. 
The Foxes argue notice and a hearing should have been required since, in effect, 
Legacy Development received a variance from the height requirements for the zone and 
variances can only be granted after notice and a hearing. The argument confuses 
substance and process. Obviously, no variance is required for a project that complies 
with the LMC. Park City's planning, building and engineering departments decided 
Legacy Development's project complies with the LMC and the Planning Department 
issued the building permit based on those decisions. 
5
 See LMC § 15-1-9(A) (2)("[T\bG Planning Department must review the Application to 
determine whether the proposal... complies with all applicable Development 
requirements of that zone, including Building Height...."). 
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If the Foxes' substantive arguments are correct and a variance should have been 
required to secure the permit, the decision to issue the permit without the variance was in 
error. But unless that decision is timely appealed, the variance argument is meaningless. 
Park City approved the project Legacy Development applied to build. With that approval 
in hand, Legacy Development was not required to recognize the error the Foxes allege 
occurred, forgo the permit and apply to the Board of Adjustment for a variance. Notice 
and a hearing were not required for Final Action on the permit application. 
D, Due Process Concerns Are Not Implicated Here 
The Foxes last argument with regard to Final Action concerns what they refer to as 
"due process." Although somewhat difficult to decipher, apparently the claim is that 
issuance of the building permit cannot be deemed Final Action because the permit was 
issued without notice to the Foxes and "due process requires notice prior to the 
elimination of [the rights of adjoining property owners, such as view corridors .. . .]" 
Foxes' Opening Brief 'at 20. 
Clearly, where notice is mandated by law, failure to supply notice can violate 
procedural due process rights. This is the teaching of Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-706(2) 
(2005) and Tolman v. Salt Lake County, 437 P.2d 442 (Utah 1968), the only authority 
cited by the Foxes m support of their due process argument. But the proposition does 
nothing to support the Foxes1 position because notice of the permit issuance was not 
required by the LMC or by state or federal law. Consequently, the lack of notice cannot 
serve as the basis for a procedural due process claim. 
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If the claim is the Foxes were entitled to notice despite the lack of legally 
mandated notice, the claim fails for lack of support. Nothing in the state or federal 
constitutions extends procedural or substantive due process protection to the "view" from 
the Foxes' property. As the court noted in Omnipoint Communications, Inc. v. City of 
White Plains, 202 F.R.D. 402, 404 (2001): 
[Ajbsent some sort of easement or covenant, a landowner is free to build 
whatever it wishes on its property without concern for the views of its 
neighbors.... If the City of White Plains owned the land adjacent to the 
synagogue, it could construct anything it wished on the property, and 
obstruct the Congregation's views, without any need to accord the 
Congregation due process. No one has a right to interfere with a 
neighbor's use of his property in order to retain a particular view.... 
The Foxes' claim does not implicate constitutional due process concerns. 
E. Final Action in Other Contexts Supports the District Court's Decision 
Treating the Planning Director's decision on the permit application as "Final 
Action" is consistent with the concept of finality in other contexts. For example, in 
Norton Construction Company v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, (Slip Copy), 2006 WL 
3526789, at fn 4 (N.D. Ohio) the court noted: "[Tjhe regulations governing the clean 
water act define 'final action' as the grant or denial of a permit application .... 33 CFR 
§ 325.2(a)(7)." The cited regulation reads "[f]inal action on the permit application is the 
signature on the letter notifying the applicant of the denial of the permit or signature of 
the issuing official on the authorizing document."6 
6
 Similarly, in Rosen v. City ofTacoma, 603 P.2d 846, 849 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979), the 
court noted that ff[n]o final action arises in the context of a building repair controversy 
until a building permit has been applied for and either issued or refused." 
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The requirement for "final action" in the federal Administrative Procedures Act 
context was explained by one federal court as follows: 
"Two conditions must be met for agency action to be considered final under 
the APA. First 'the agency action should mark the consummation of the 
agency's decision making process; and [second], the action should be one 
by which rights or obligations have been determined or from which legal 
consequences flow.' " 
High Sierra Hikers Association v. United States Forest Service, 436 F. Supp. 2d 1117 
(E.D. Cal. 2006) (internal citations omitted). In this case, the Planning Director's 
decision marked "the consummation of the [city's] decision making process...," and 
Legacy Development's rights and obligations with regard to its project were "determined" 
upon issuance of the permit. Id. Consequently, the decision constituted "final action" on 
the application. 
II. THE APPEAL PERIOD IS NOT TOLLED UNTIL THE FOXES1 
ALLEGED DISCOVERY OF THE APPROVED BUILDING HEIGHT 
Although filed six months after permit issuance, the Foxes claim their appeal was 
timely because they filed it within ten days of discovering that the permit allowed what 
they characterize as a building height violation. In effect, the Foxes argue the statutory 
appeal period should be tolled pending discovery. One problem with the argument is that 
it finds no support in the law. Neither the LMC nor the state code tolls the appeal period 
for a neighboring owner who lacks knowledge regarding the details of permitted 
construction. An appeal within ten days is a jurisdictional prerequisite and the Foxesf 
claim of ignorance is legally insufficient to avoid the requirement. 
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Even if ignorance could toll the appeal period, the particular nature of the Foxes1 
ignorance would offer no relief The Foxes claim they did not know how tall Legacy 
Development's buildings would be until the structures were almost completed. But they 
did know about the decision they ultimately challenged — the Department's decision to 
issue the building permit.7 The Foxes admit they knew the building permit had been 
issued by the fall of 2005, months before they filed their appeal. Whether or not the 
Foxes knew what building height was allowed by the permit, they knew the Department 
decided to issue the permit and it is that decision which the Foxes had to appeal within 
ten days, if at all. 
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Foxes had no way to know a 
building permit had been issued, compelling reasons exist to apply the LMC as written. 
A developer typically secures a building permit when the developer is ready to begin 
construction. Adversely affected owners appropriately have a period of time in which to 
appeal. Just as appropriately, however, the developer should be allowed to proceed with 
reasonable haste. Typically, construction loan interest is accruing, third parties are 
scheduled to begin contractually mandated and scheduled work and, particularly in 
Summit County, the building season is short. After the appeal period runs, the developer 
should be able to rely on the permit to proceed, safe in the knowledge that money spent 
on the project is not at risk. 
In their words, the Foxes appealed "the decision of the Park City Community 
Development Department to issue a building permit for the construction of [the Project]." 
(R. 133 at Exhibit D.) 
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The district court recognized the burden of discovery placed on the Foxes and 
others in their position. It also recognized, however, that the burden reflects a sensible 
policy decision made at the legislative level: 
Park City, and most other municipalities and counties and the State of Utah 
itself, have made a policy decision to favor the builder/developer so that 
upon receipt of a building permit, that builder may commence work with an 
assurance that the expenditure of work and money will not be challenged at 
any time in the future that someone believes an error was made or an 
ordinance has been violated. 
(R. 222.) 
In short, at some point in time certainty regarding the finality of the city's decision 
is necessary. Under the Foxes1 interpretation, however, certainty is never available. An 
adversely affected neighbor without knowledge of the building permit could challenge 
the development months after permit issuance, after hundreds of thousands of dollars 
have been spent improving the property. The ten day appeal period reflects a policy 
decision striking a balance between the needs of the developer and those of neighboring 
property owners. 
III. THE SUBSTANTIVE VALIDITY OF THE BUILDING PERMIT IS NOT 
AT ISSUE 
In their "Statement of Facts11 and other points in her opening brief, the Foxes argue 
that because Legacy Development's project violates the LMC, and because a building 
permit issued for a project in violation of the LMC is not valid, the subject building 
permit is not valid. The Foxes' conclusion based on the argument is that an invalidly 
issued permit "cannot be considered a 'Final Action/" Foxes' Opening Brief 'at 16. 
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The Foxes cite nothing in support of their conclusion. Instead, they rely on the 
force of their logic. The error in the logic is that, again, it confuses substance and 
process. The ten day appeal period is triggered by the Final Action, not by a 
determination regarding the validity of the Final Action. In other words, the appeal 
period runs from the date of the decision, not from the date of a determination regarding 
the correctness of the decision. The Planning Directors decision that the permit 
application complies with the LMC, whether right or wrong, was the Final Action. 
The Foxes' underlying premise is that a permit issued based on an erroneous code 
interpretation can never be "final." But the law simply does not support the premise. The 
timeliness of an appeal is not judged by the outcome of the appeal. Absent a timely 
appeal, the merits of the matter are never reached since timeliness is "a jurisdictional 
prerequisite to [the Court!s] review." Alva v. Teen Help, 469 F.3d 946, 948 (10th Cir. 
2006). Only by a timely challenge to the Final Action is the question of the validity of 
the permit ever reached. 
In summary, whether Legacy Development's project violates the LMC is a 
substantive issue not now before the Court. The issue before the Court is whether the 
Foxes appealed within ten days of Final Action. Final Action occurred when the 
Planning Director decided to issue the permit. The decision could have been wrong. 
Obviously, Park City and Legacy Development believe otherwise. But the substantive 
propriety of the decision can only be challenged if timely appealed. The Foxes1 failure to 
timely appeal precludes review of the decision. 
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IV. EQUITY AND PUBLIC POLICY FAVOR LEGACY DEVELOPMENT 
The statutory appeal period is not subject to modification based on equity or 
policy considerations. Nevertheless, such considerations favor Legacy Development's 
position for several reasons. 
First, absent the LMC and its enabling act, Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-101, et seq., 
the Foxes have no right to challenge what Legacy Development builds on its property. 
Both the right to challenge and the limits on that right are created by the relevant code 
provisions. Those provisions grant the Foxes a ten day appeal right, a right they would 
not otherwise have.8 The district court recognized the point when it noted that "any 
'right1 plaintiffs have is created by the LMC and to attempt to redress a claimed wrong 
that same LMC must be strictly adhered to.!t (R. 220.) 
Second, if the appeal period is not ten days, then how long is it? Although the 
Foxes never answer the question, this Court does not have the same prerogative. The 
district court's subject matter jurisdiction depends on a conclusion that the appeal was 
timely. To reach that conclusion, this Court must have a framework for its analysis. If 
that framework is not the LMC and its enabling statute, what guides the Court's decision 
on timeliness? 
The LMC's ten day appeal period is authorized by Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-704(2006), 
which sets ten days as both the minimum "time to appeal" and the default appeal period 
in the absence of a municipal ordinance establishing the time to appeal. 
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The Foxes offer no answers to these critical questions.9 Instead, they argue that 
the city's legal staff, Planning Department, Planning Commission and Board of 
Adjustment all got it wrong when they interpreted their code as requiring an appeal 
within ten days. By failing to answer the questions, the Foxes leave an analytical vacuum 
for the Court to fill without guidance from the law. In contrast, Legacy Development 
directs the Court to the only law on point: the LMC and the state code provisions which 
both require an appeal within ten days. 
Finally, the facts are that two and a half years ago Legacy Development applied 
for and received permission to build its project. When no one appealed the permit 
approval within the ten days allowed by code, Legacy Development proceeded with 
construction in good faith. At the same time, the Foxes knew the construction activity 
they observed next door required a permit. And they "believed" that the observed activity 
was in fact permitted. (R. 158-160.) They claim they did not know exactly what the 
permit allowed, but the means of knowledge was readily available. The Foxes did 
9
 Although the argument was never raised below, in their opening brief the Foxes argue 
that the doctrine of laches provides the remedy if they waited too long to appeal. The 
obvious problem with the laches argument is that it turns every building permit appeal 
filed outside of the ten day window into a case about whether the challenging party, 
under the circumstances, waited too long. Mawhinney v. Jensen, 120 Utah 142, 232 P.2d 
769, 773 (Utah 1951) ("The question of laches can only be determined under the 
circumstances of each case ....") Conceivably, the permit holder could face repeated 
challenges based on the individual circumstances of the challenger. It might prevail by 
establishing one challenger waited too long only to lose when a subsequent challenger 
proves that, under the circumstances peculiar to it, laches is not available as a defense. 
The doctrine of laches is not a viable way to measure the timeliness of a building permit 
appeal. 
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nothing to acquire the readily available knowledge for more than six months while they 
watched the vertical construction slowly impede some part of their "view." 
From an equity perspective, the question is what was the Foxes' obligation under 
these circumstances? The Foxes suggest they had no obligation until the alleged 
violation was finally apparent to them. In other words, they suggest a subjective rule: 
every appeal is timely as long as it is filed within ten days of recognition by the appealing 
party that a code violation exists. 
The problems with the Foxes' subjective rule are myriad. Timeliness becomes a 
meaningless concept since it is tied to no particular benchmark. It would vary with the 
diligence, observational powers and even vacation schedule of the petitioner. Moreover, 
the developer's investment in its project is never secure. As is true here, a developer can 
spend many months and hundreds of thousands of dollars completing a project in reliance 
on a validly secured building permit only to face the prospect of devastating economic 
loss if a neighbor happens to notice an alleged code violation. 
Finally, the Foxes' subjective rule is not the law. LMC § 15-1-18(E) requires 
every appeal to be filed within ten calendar days of permit issuance. In this 
circumstance, the law makes no exception for neglect, even excusable neglect. The 
building permit was issued on July 14, 2005, and the Foxes missed the statutory deadline 
when they failed to appeal by July 24,2005, 
The "timely" administrative appeal of a land use decision is "a condition precedent 
to judicial review...." Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-701(2)(2005). Because the Foxes cannot 
now file a "timely" administrative appeal, they are not able to satisfy a condition 
23 
precedent to judicial review. Consequently, the Court is left with no option but to affirm. 
See, e.g., Lund v. Cottonwood Meadows Company, 392 P.2d 40 (Utah 1964) (affirming 
summary judgment for defendants where plaintiff failed to appeal to the proper 
administrative tribunal within the allotted time period). 
CONCLUSION 
The only issue properly before the Court is the only issue decided by the Board of 
Adjustment: whether the Foxes1 appeal is timely. The Foxes challenged the decision to 
issue the building permit more than six months after issuance, and several months after 
they admit they knew it had been issued. Given these facts, the district court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction over this matter and properly granted Legacy Development's 
summary judgment motion dismissing the Foxes1 claims. This Court should affirm. 
Dated this 16th day of November 2007. 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON 
ERIC P. LEE 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee Legacy 
Development Group, LLC 
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A. DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS FROM THE PARK CITY LAND MANAGEMENT 
CODE 
B. REBUTTAL TO THE FOXES ' SUBSTANTIVE ALLEGATIONS 
ADDENDUM 
A- DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS FROM THE PARK CITY LAND 
MANAGEMENT CODE 
15-1 -8. REVIEW PROCEDURE UNDER THE CODE. 
(A) No Building Permit shall be valid for any Building project unless the plans for the 
proposed Structure have been submitted to and have been approved by the Planning, 
Engineering and Building Departments. 
(B) No new Use shall be valid on any Property within the City unless the Use is allowed. 
(C) No Subdivision shall be valid without preliminary approval of the Planning 
Commission and final approval by the City Council with all conditions of approval 
completed. 
(D) Proposals submitted to the Planning Department must be reviewed according to the 
type of Application filed. Unless otherwise provided for in this LMC, only one (1) 
Application at a time, per Property, will be accepted and processed. 
(E) The Planning, Engineering and Building Departments review all Allowed Uses, 
Administrative Lot Line Adjustments and Administrative Conditional Use permits. 
P?) Projects in the Historic District and Historic Structures outside the Historic District 
are subject to design review under the Historic District Guidelines. 
(G) Conditional Uses and Master Planned Developments are initially reviewed by staff 
and submitted to the Planning Commission for review, final permitting and approval. 
(H) Subdivisions and Plat Amendments are initially reviewed by the Planning 
Commission and submitted to the City Council for final approval. 
(I) Variances, Non-Conforming Uses and Non-Complying Structures are reviewed by the 
Board of Adjustment. 
(J) No review may occur until all applicable fees have been paid. Final approval is not 
effective until all other fees including engineering fees have been paid, and following 
applicable staff review. 
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*A11 Applications are filed with the Planning Department. If the Planning Department is 
not the reviewing body (y), a staff member will make a recommendation to the 
appropriate decision making body (X). 
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15-1 -9. ALLOWED USE REVIEW PROCESS. 
(A) An Applicant must file a Complete Application, using the forms established by the 
Planning Department, and include payment of all fees. On any Application to construct a 
Building or other Improvement to Property which is defined by this Code as an Allowed 
Use in the zone in which the Building is proposed, the Planning Department must review 
the Application to determine whether the proposal: 
(1) is an Allowed Use within the zone for which it is proposed; 
(2) complies with all applicable Development requirements of that zone, including 
Building Height, Setback, Front, Side, and Rear Yards, and Lot coverage; 
(3) respects Lot Lines of a legally subdivided Lot; 
(4) meets the applicable parking requirements; 
(5) conforms to the Park City Architectural Design Guidelines and/or the Historic District 
Design Guidelines, and the architectural review process established for that zone; 
(6) can be adequately serviced by roads, and existing or proposed utility systems or lines; 
and 
(7) pertains to land in which all tax assessments have been paid. 
(B) If approved by the Planning Department Planning Staff, the plans must be forwarded 
to the Engineering Department and Building Department. The plans shall be reviewed 
for Building Code compliance and Permit issuance procedures. Approval of Allowed 
Uses must be noted by the issuance of a Building Permit in compliance with the 
provisions of the Uniform Building Code, as adopted by Park City. 
(C) If the Application does not comply with the requirements of the zone, the Planning 
Department shall notify the Owner of the project or his Agent, if any, stating specifically 
what requirements of the zone have not been satisfied, and also stating whether the 
project could be reviewed as submitted as a Conditional Use for that zone. 
(D) DISCLAIMER. No permit issued shall be valid if any of the criteria listed in this 
section has not been met. 
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15-1 -12. NOTICE. 
Notice of a public hearing before the City Council, Planning Commission, Board of 
Adjustment, and Historic District Commission must be provided in accordance with this 
section. All notices, unless otherwise specified in this Code or State law, must describe 
the proposed action affecting the subject Property or modification to the Park City 
General Plan, and the time, place and date set for public hearing on the matter. Notice 
shall be given according to 15-1-20 Notice Matrix and as follows: 
(A) POSTED NOTICES. The Community Development Department must post notice 
on the Property affected by the Application and on the City's official website or in at least 
three (3) public locations within the municipality. 
(B) PUBLISHED NOTICE. Published notice shall be given by publication in a 
newspaper having general circulation in Park City. 
(C) COURTESY NOTICE. As a courtesy to adjacent Property Owners, the Applicant 
must provide the Planning Department with stamped and pre-addressed envelopes for 
each Owner of record of each Parcel located entirely or partly within three hundred feet 
(300f) from all Property Lines of the subject Property, together with a mailing list for 
those Owners. The addresses for adjacent Owners must be as shown on the most recently 
available Summit County tax assessment rolls. If the subject Property is a Condominium, 
the Owners Association is sufficient in lieu of the address for each unit Owner. Courtesy 
notice is not a legal requirement, and any defect in courtesy notice shall not affect or 
invalidate any hearing or action by the City Council or any Board or Commission. 
(D) APPLICANT NOTICE. For each land Use Application, the Planning Department 
must notify the Applicant of the date, time and place of each public hearing and public 
meeting to consider the Application and of any Final Action on a pending Application. 
(E) EFFECT OF NOTICE. Proof that notice was given pursuant to subsections (A) and 
(B), above is prima facie evidence that notice was properly given. If notice given under 
authority of this section is not challenged as provided for under State law within thirty 
(30) days after the date of the hearing for which the challenged notice was given, the 
notice is considered adequate and proper. 
(F) OWNERS ASSOCIATION REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION. 
(1) REGISTRATION. Owners associations desiring notice of requests for Building 
Permits within their boundaries must file written registration annually with the Park City 
Building Department and pay an annual fee of fifty dollars ($50.00). The registration 
must consist of a copy of the Owners association's Utah State business or corporate 
registration and the name(s), addresses including post office box numbers, and telephone 
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numbers of at least three (3) authorized representatives of the Owners association and a 
notarized statement certifying that these individuals are the authorized representatives of 
said association. 
Associations not registered with the City will not be included in the published list of 
Owners associations and do not receive notice of Building Permit requests prior to their 
issuance. 
Any change(s) in the above information must be forwarded in writing to the Building 
Department within ten (10) days of the change. 
(2) NOTICE. Prior to, or at the time of, Application for a permit for any Development, 
the Applicant must file with the City evidence of notification to the appropriate registered 
Owners association(s). Acceptable evidence of notification shall be the following: 
(a) the properly executed notice form, as approved by the City; or 
(b) a signed return receipt from a certified letter posted to the registered association 
representative, with a copy of the notice form approved by the City. 
(3) CITY NOT PARTY TO DISPUTES. The City is not the arbiter of disputes between 
an Applicant and an Owners association. Nothing herein shall be interpreted to require 
Owners association consent prior to City Final Action. 
15-1 -17. VESTING. 
(A) (1) An Applicant is entitled to approval of a land Use Application if the Application 
conforms to the requirements of an applicable land Use ordinance in effect when a 
complete Application is submitted and all fees have been paid, unless: 
(a) the land Use authority, on the record, finds that a compelling, countervailing public 
interest would be jeopardized by approving the Application, or 
(b) in the manner provided by local ordinance and before the Application is submitted, 
the municipality has formally initiated proceedings to amend its ordinances in a manner 
that would prohibit approval of the Applicaiton as submitted. 
(2) The municipality shall process an Application without regard to proceedings initiated 
to amend the municipality's ordinances if: 
(a) 180 days have pased since the proceedings were initiated; and 
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(b) the proceedings have not resulted in an enactment that prohibits approval of the 
Application as submitted. 
(3) An Application for a land Use approval is considered submitted and complete when 
the Application is provided in a form that complies with the requirements of applicable 
ordinances and all applicable fees have been paid. 
(4) The continuing validity of an approval of a land Use Application is conditioned upon 
the Applicant proceeding after approval to implement the approval with reasonable 
diligence. 
(B) A municipality is bound by the terms and standards of applicable land Use ordinances 
and shall comply with mandatory provisions of those ordinances. 
15-1 -18. APPEALS AND RECONSIDERATION PROCESS. 
(A) STAFF. Any decision by the Planning Director regarding Application of this LMC 
to a Property may be appealed to the Planning Commission. Decisions regarding 
compliance with the Historic District Guidelines may be appealed to the Historic 
Preservation Board. The Appeal must be filed with the Planning Department. There shall 
be no additional notice for Appeal of the staff determination other than listing the matter 
on the agenda, unless notice of the staff review was provided in which case the same 
notice must be given for the Appeal. 
(B) HISTORIC PRESERVATION BOARD (HPB). Final Actions by the Historic 
Preservation Board may be appealed to the Board of Adjustment. 
(C) PLANNING COMMISSION. Final Actions by the Planning Commission on staff 
Appeals may be appealed to the Board of Adjustment. Final Action by the Planning 
Commission on Conditional Use Permits and MPDs may be appealed to the City 
Council. Only those decisions in which the Planning Commission has applied a land Use 
ordinance to a particular Application, Person, or Parcel may be appealed to an appeal 
authority. 
(D) STANDING TO APPEAL. The following has standing to appeal a Final Action: 
(1) Any Person who submitted written comment or testified on a proposal before the 
Planning Department, Historic Preservation Board or Planning Commission; 
(2) The Owner of any Property within three hundred feet (300!) of the boundary of the 
subject Site; 
(3) Any City official, Board or Commission having jurisdiction over the matter; and 
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(4) The Owner of the subject Property. 
(E) TIMING. All Appeals must be made within ten (10) calendar days of the Final 
Action. The reviewing body, with the consultation of the appellant, shall set a date for the 
Appeal. 
(F) FORM OF APPEALS. Appeals to the Planning Commission or Board of 
Adjustment must be filed with the Planning Department. Appeals to the City Council 
must be filed with the City Recorder. Appeals must be by letter or petition, and must 
contain the name, address, and telephone number of the petitioner; his or her relationship 
to the project or subject Property; and must have a comprehensive statement of all the 
reasons for the Appeal, including specific provisions of the law, if known, that are 
alleged to be violated by the action taken. The Applicant shall pay the applicable fee 
established by resolution. The adversly affected party shall present to the appeal 
authority every theory of relief that it can raise in district court. 
(G) BURDEN OF PROOF AND STANDARD OF REVIEW. The appeal authority 
shall act in a quasi-judicial manner. The appellant has the burden of proving that the land 
Use authority erred. Except for appeals to the Board of Adjustment, the appeal authority 
shall review factual matters de novo and it shall determine the correctness of a decision 
of the land Use authority in its interpretation and Application of a land Use ordinance. 
(H) WRITTEN FINDINGS REQUIRED. The Appellate Body shall direct Staff to 
prepare detailed written: 
(1) Findings of Fact which explain and support the Staff decision; 
(2) Conclusions as to how a contrary decision would violate the provisions of this LMC, 
other City ordinances, or applicable state or federal laws or regulations. 
(D CITY COUNCIL ACTION ON APPEALS. 
(1) The City Council, with the consultation of the Appellant, shall set a date for the 
Appeal. 
(2) The City Recorder shall notify the Owner of the Appeal date. The City Recorder shall 
obtain the findings, conclusions and all other pertinent information from the Planning 
Department and shall transmit them to the Council. 
(3) The City Council may affirm, reverse, or affirm in part and reverse in part any 
properly appealed decision of the Planning Commission. The City Council may remand 
the matter to the appropriate body with directions for specific Areas of review or 
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clarification. City Council review of petitions of Appeal shall be limited to consideration 
of only those matters raised by the petition(s), unless the Council by motion, enlarges the 
scope of the Appeal to accept information on other matters. 
(4) Staff must prepare written findings within fifteen (15) working days of the City 
Council vote on the matter. 
(J) CITY COUNCIL CALL-UP. Within fifteen (15) calendar days of Final Action on 
any project, the City Council, on its own motion, may call any Final Action taken by the 
Planning Commission or Planning Director up for review by the Council. The call-up 
shall require the majority vote of the Council. Notice of the call-up shall be given to the 
Chairman of the Planning Commission and/or Planning Director by the Recorder, 
together with the date set by the Council for consideration of the merits of the matter. The 
Recorder shall also provide notice as required by Section 15-1 -12 herein. In calling a 
matter up, the Council may limit the scope of the call-up hearing to certain issues, and 
need not take public input at the hearing. The City Council, with the consultation of the 
Applicant, shall set a date for the call-up. The City Recorder shall notify the Applicant of 
the call-up date. The City Recorder shall obtain the findings, and all other pertinent 
information and transmit them to the Council. 
(K) NOTICE. Notice of all Appeals to City Council or call-ups shall be given by: 
(1) Publishing the matter once at least seven (7) days prior to the hearing in a newspaper 
having general circulation in Park City; and 
(2) By mailing courtesy notice seven (7) days prior to the hearing to all parties who 
received mailed courtesy notice for the original action. 
(L) STAY OF APPROVAL PENDING REVIEW OF APPEAL. Upon the filing of an 
Appeal, any approval granted by the Historic District Commission or the Planning 
Commission will be suspended until the City Council has acted on the Appeal. 
(M) APPEAL FROM THE CITY COUNCIL. The Applicant or any Person aggrieved 
by City action on the project may Appeal from the Final Action by the City Council 
affecting the project to a court of competent jurisdiction. The decision of the Council 
stands, and those affected by the decision may act in reliance on it unless and until the 
court enters an interlocutory or final order modifying the decision. 
(N) FINALITY OF ACTION. Final Action occurs when the deciding body has adopted 
and executed written findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
(O) RECONSIDERATION. The City Council, and any Board or Commission, may 
reconsider at any time any legislative decision upon an affirmative vote of a majority of 
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that body. The City Council, and any Board or Commission, may reconsider any quasi-
judicial decision upon an affirmative vote of a majority of that body at any time prior to 
Final Action. Any action taken by the deciding body shall not be reconsidered or 
rescinded at a special meeting unless the number of members of the deciding body 
present at the special meeting is equal to or greater than the number of members present 
at the meeting when the action was approved. 
(P) No participating member of the appeal panel may entertain an appeal in which he or 
she acted as the land Use authority. 
15-10-9. VARIANCE. 
(A) Any Person or entity desiring a waiver or modification of the requirements of the 
Land Management Code as applied to a Parcel or Property that he/she owns, leases, or in 
which he/she holds some other beneficial interest may apply to the Board of Adjustment 
for a variance from the terms of the Land Management Code. 
(B) An Application for variance review must be field with the Planning Department, and 
the required fee paid in advance. The Application shall state the nature of the hardship 
and the nature of the variance requested. If the request for a variance is a result of a 
denial of any Building Permit or Conditional Use approval, the application shall so state, 
and all documents on file concerning the matter shall be forwarded to the Board for 
review as a part of the request. The Applicant or the City may present any information as 
might be reasonably required by the Board in evaluating the request. 
(C) Variances shall be granted only if all of the following conditions are found to exist: 
(1) Literal enforcement of the Land Management Code would cause an unreasonable 
hardship for the Applicant that is not necessary to carry out the general purpose of the 
Land Management Code; 
(2) There are special circumstances attached to the Property that do not generally apply to 
other Properties in the same zone; 
(3) Granting the variance is essential to the enjoyment of a substantial Property right 
possessed by other Property in the same zone; 
(4) The variance will not substantially affect the General Plan and will not be contrary to 
the public interest; and 
(5) The spirit of the Land Management Code is observed and substantial justice done. 
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(D) (1) In determining whether or not enforcement of the zoning ordinance would cause 
unreasonable hardship under Subsection 15-10-9(C)(1), the Board of Adjustment may not 
find an unreasonable hardship unless the alleged hardship is located on or associated with 
the Property for which the variance is sought and comes from circumstances peculiar to 
the Property, not from conditions that are general to the neighborhood. 
(2) In determining whether or not enforcement of the Land Management Code would 
cause unreasonable hardship under Subsection 15-10-9(C)(1), the Board of Adjustment 
may not find an unreasonable hardship if the hardship is self-imposed or economic. 
(E) In determining whether or not there are special circumstances attached to the Property 
under Subsection 15-10-9(C)(2), the Board of Adjustment may find that special 
circumstances exist only if the special circumstances relate to the hardship complained of 
and deprive the Property of privileges granted other Properties in the same zone. 
The Applicant shall bear the burden of proving that all of the conditions justifying a 
variance have been met. 
(F) Variances run with the land. 
(G) The Board of Adjustment may condition a variance by requiring the Owner to obtain 
a Building or other necessary permit within one (1) year of issuance of the variance, or 
the variance shall be null and void. 
(H) The Board of Adjustment and any other body may not grant a Use variance. 
(I) In granting a variance, the Board of Adjustment may impose additional requirements 
on the Applicant that will: 
(1) mitigate any harmful affects of the variance; or 
(2) serve the purpose of the standard or requirement that is waived or modified. 
15-15-1.90. FINAL ACTION. 
The later of the final vote or written decision on a matter. 
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B. REBUTTAL TO THE FOXES1 SUBSTANTIVE ALLEGATIONS 
The substantive arguments raised in the Foxes1 summary judgment motion are not 
properly before the Court. The only issue properly before the Court is the only issue 
decided by the Board of Adjustment and the district court: Did the Foxes file a timely 
administrative appeal? 
If the Court could review the substantive issues in the context of this appeal, it 
would find that a decision on the issues depends on the resolution of disputed issues of 
material fact. The Foxes failed to meet their burden of establishing the lack of material 
fact issues. Consequently, summary judgment was not available to the Foxes even if a 
substantive review were otherwise proper. 
If the Court is inclined to consider the Foxesf arguments on the substantive claims, 
it will find them unpersuasive. The triplex and grade issues present complicated and 
technical factual questions decided by the city's planning, engineering and building 
departments. The Foxes1 lay interpretations of these matters are incompetent from both 
an evidentiary and technical perspective. 
For example, in paragraph 1 of their "Statement of Facts," the Foxes' cite nothing 
but their unverified complaint allegations for the following: 
L On or about May 6, 2005, Legacy Development applied for a building 
permit with the Department for the construction of three residential 
buildings.... 
Foxes' Opening Brief dX. 5. Legacy Development's dispute with paragraph 1 lies in the 
Foxes' characterization of the project as "three residential buildings...." Legacy 
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Development applied for and received permission to build a triplex. The difference is 
material. One of the Foxes' primary arguments depends on their characterization of the 
project as something other than a triplex. 
In paragraph 4 of their "Statement of Facts," the Foxes cite their unverified 
complaint and the Affidavit of Bret Fox in support of the following: 
4. By its application, Legacy Development sought to construct the three 
buildings to heights substantially in excess of the relevant height 
restrictions outlined in the LMC. 
The Complaint allegations are not evidence. And the cited affidavit paragraph is contrary 
to Mr. Foxes' deposition testimony. In relevant part, the deposition testimony reads: 
Q. Did either [Park City Chief Building Official] Ron Ivie or [Park City 
Planning Director] Patrick Putt tell you that two of the buildings are over 
50 feet? 
A- I don't recall if they stated it that way, but when asked about their height, 
they verified that those buildings were over 50 feet in height. 
Q. Measured from where? 
A. Without the plans in front of me, it would be difficult for me to describe 
where those heights are. 
Q. Do you have any knowledge of how the building height was measured by 
the city? 
A. I believe that would ask me to speculate at how the city is arriving at what 
they believe the height is, so Fm not sure I can answer that accurately. 
(R. 133 at Exhibit A.) Mr. Fox also testified that he "believes" the City measured the 
height "in two different ways." Id. 
What Mr. Fox did not say, and what he is not competent to say, is anything in support 
of the assertions in paragraph 4, including: 
1
 As found by the Board of Adjustment in its August 24, 2006 order, Legacy 
Development's "building permit application for a triplex structure on the property was 
received by the City on May 6,2005." (R. 133 at Exhibit M) (emphasis added). 
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• What Legacy Development "sought" to construct by its building permit 
application. 
• The applied for height of Legacy Developments project. 
• The point from which project height is measured in Legacy Development's 
application. 
As documented by the City's Planning Director in his June 14, 2006 Staff Report to the 
Planning Commission, Legacy Development applied for permission to build to a height 
of 38 feet measured from an average grade line established by the city: 
Building height is measured from Existing Grade. Existing grade is defined 
in the [LMC] as "the Grade of a property prior to any Development or 
Construction Activity." The LMC definition of "Development" includes 
grading, clearing, grubbing, and excavation. Due to the previously 
documented excavation trespass which occurred on the property, it was 
impossible to establish original Existing Grade, therefore, the Planning and 
Building Departments established the average grade of the property as the 
basis for determining the maximum building height for the subject triplex 
building. 
(R. 117.) 
Addressing the triplex issue, the Foxes again make an unsubstantiated claim in 
paragraph 9 of their "Statement of Facts": 
9. Building C is not connected physically in any way to either Building A 
or building B. 
The same evidentiary problems exist here. The cited complaint allegation is not 
evidence. Moreover, the allegation is contradicted by Mr. Foxes' owned deposition 
testimony. In response to a question regarding the significance of a construction drawing 
the Foxes attached to their summary judgment motion, Mr. Fox testified: 
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Well, I believe this shows the footprints of the three buildings and shows 
there is a minor connection between two of them and a few connecting 
walls between — well, let's put it this way. It appears that from one 
building to the middle building there is one wall connecting the two, and 
from the middle building to the other building, the third building, there is 
one and perhaps three walls connecting. 
(R. 133 at Exhibit A.) 
The Foxes continue their baseless factual assertions in Paragraph 11 of their 
"Statement of Facts": 
11. Rather than use the Existing Grade or Final Grade to determine the 
three buildings' Heights as required by the LMC, the Department used a 
newly invented "Interpretive Grade," which was arbitrarily determined by 
drawing a straight line from the top of the lot to the bottom of the lot 
Neither the unverified complaint nor the cited affidavit paragraph supports the assertion. 
In fact, Mr. foxes deposition testimony demonstrated that he had no knowledge 
concerning how Planning Department confirmed compliance with the height requirement. 
On pages 15 and 16 of his deposition transcript, Mr. Fox expresses his "belief1 that the 
"city measured the height from a finished grade and from an average grade. I think they 
determine the height from two different — in two different ways." And on page 58, 
Mr. Fox refers to a meeting with the City's Planning Director and Chief Building Official 
at which the issue was discussed. Mr. Fox admits he left the meeting "more confused 
than when [he] arrived...." 
In paragraph 13 of their "Statement of Facts," the Foxes again cite their 
unverified complaint as evidentiary support for their position on the substantive 
issues: 
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13. The three buildings exceeded the maximum allowed height under the 
LMCfor either a single family residence, a duplex, or a triplex, due to the 
tallest point of the three buildings being in excess of 48 feet from Final 
Grade. 
As noted, the Foxes offer no competent evidence in support of the "three buildings" 
assertion or the claim that the constructed height of the triplex "exceeds 48 feet from 
Final Grade." 
The triplex and grade issues involve complicated and technical factual matters 
addressed by the City's planning, engineering and building departments as a part of the 
permit application review process. The Foxes1 lay interpretations of these matters lack 
competent evidentiary support and are demonstrably wrong. 
With regard to the triplex issue, the Foxes misconstrue the applicable LMC 
definitions, then use the definitions to reach the conclusion that Legacy Development has 
not built a triplex. One significant error in the Foxes' analysis lies in their reliance on the 
concept of "attached" buildings. They assume, without support, that a triplex must be 
three buildings "attached" by "common party walls." 
According to LMC § 15-15-1.77(B), a "Triplex" is a "Building containing three 
(3) Dwelling Units." A "Building" is any "Structure, or any part thereof, built or used for 
the support, shelter, or enclosure of any Use ...." LMC § 15-15-1.29. A "Structure" is 
"[a]nything constructed, the Use of which requires a fixed location on or in the ground, or 
attached to something having a fixed location on the ground and which imposes an 
impervious material on or above the ground; definition includes 'Building'." LMC 
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§ 15-15-1.222. In other words, a triplex is "anything constructed" with three "Dwelling 
Units."2 "Common walls" are simply not required under the LMC "Triplex" definition. 
The grade issue highlights what is perhaps the most significant deficiency in the 
Foxes' position on the substantive issues. The Foxes argue that the City decided the issue 
incorrectly, but there is no record of how the City decided the issue. Assuming a timely 
appeal, a record of the City's review process would have been developed in the 
appropriate administrative tribunals and that record would be available for the Court's 
review. Without this kind of administrative record, the Court has nothing to review. 
The applicable standard of review emphasizes the importance of an administrative 
record for the Court's review: 
It is well established in Utah that "courts of law cannot substitute their 
judgment in the area of zoning regulations for that of the [municipality's] 
governing body." Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corp., 16 Utah 2d 192, 398 P.2d 
27, 29 (1965) (footnote omitted). Instead, the courts afford a comparatively 
wide latitude of discretion to administrative bodies charged with the 
responsibility of zoning, as well as endowing their actions with a 
presumption of correctness and validity, because of the complexity of 
factors involved in the matter of zoning and the specialized knowledge of 
the administrative body. Cottonwood Heights Citizen Ass'n v. Board of 
Comm'rs, 593 P.2d 138, 140 (Utah 1979). Thus, the courts will not consider 
the wisdom, necessity, or advisability or otherwise interfere with a zoning 
determination unless "it is shown that there is no reasonable basis to justify 
the action taken." Id. 
Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 482, 45-86 (Utah Ct. App 1990) (rev'd in part 
on other grounds, Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 212 (Utah 1992)). 
2
 The phrase "Dwelling Unit" is defined by reference to use: a "Building or portion 
thereof designed for Use as the residence or sleeping place of one (1) or more Persons 
...." LMC §15-15-1.78. 
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The Foxes are asking the Court to "consider the wisdom, necessity or 
advisability..." of the City's decision regarding grade without first creating and providing 
the record necessary for the Court to determine "that there is no reasonable basis to 
justify the action taken." Id. The law clearly requires that the Foxes' request be denied. 
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